How stowaways undermine security at Nigerian airports

 Wherever stowaway occurs, it is an indictment on any country’s national security. It is a thing government must carefully look into, writes WOLE SHADARE

Last week, a stowaway from Lagos aboard an Arik Air flight was discovered after the aircraft landed at the OR Tambo International Airport, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Unfortunately, the victim did not survive as he was discovered dead inside the enclosure. This brings to the fore the incessant cases of stowaway incidents at many of the nation’s aerodromes and calls for concern over security at the airports. The situation has seriously exposed the under-belly of aviation security and the airlines’ security apparatchik.

This infiltration and many more highlight the paucity of security around the nation’s airport and the clear and present danger posed by insider threat in the system. It has spread through the entire airport system, meaning people who work in these sensitive areas are obviously oblivious of the security challenges this poses.

However, this is not the first or second time people would breach the security of the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), the Nigeria Air force, the State Security Service (SSS), even the immigrations, customs and other security agencies at the airport. In August 2013, 13-year old Daniel Ohikhena hid himself in the wheel well of Arik Air aircraft flight WS 544 and flew from Benin city to Lagos.

Experts in the industry said that Daniel survived the flight to Lagos because he was small and could fit into the little space that remained after the tyres had gone in and that because the flight was a short one, the aircraft did not fly in high altitude so it did not go above the area that had oxygen and the temperature was not too severe as to kill the boy who thought he was flying to America, in that short distance.

In March 2010, a Nigerian, Okechukwu Okeke, was found dead in the nose wheel compartment of the United States carrier, Delta Air Lines, Boeing B777 aircraft parked on the tarmac of the Lagos airport.

On September 19, 2010, another Nigerian man was discovered crushed to death in the wheel well of Arik Air flight, which arrived from Johannesburg, South Africa and before Daniel’s incident, another Nigerian was discovered in the undercarriage compartment of Arik Air aircraft, after it returned from a flight to New York.

Although incidents of stowaways are not limited to Nigeria, it is worthy to note that it behoves on security agencies at the airports to continue to improve and device methods of countering these challenges as it tells a bad story on securing the airport from bigger threats.

The temperature in the nosewheel, also known as the main landing gear, is extremely cold (minus 58 degrees) during flight such that it is almost impossible to survive there for up to 12 hours, which is the average duration of Lagos-Atlanta flight.

The cold apart, the area is not climate controlled or pressurised and it also takes well grounded aircraft engineers and dispatchers to know the depth of the nose-wheel’s well (where the main landing gear retracts into) to ascertain whether it can accommodate the stowaway or not. More so, stowaways hardly survive and they risk being crushed by the gear or bay doors if the bay is not large enough for the stowaway.

They can also fall off the strut, especially when it is extended after take-off or before touchdown. This is often exacerbated by the force of the wind. Stowaways also risk falling out of the bay should the doors open unexpectedly.

This can be caused if the door mechanism cannot support the weight of the stowaway. Also, the stowaway may be asleep or unconscious when the gear is lowered for landing.

Some other analysts also explain that for the deadly operation to be somewhat successful, the engineers will know the precise location the stowaway will be in the nose-wheel well, the precise angle he must position himself, regardless of the discomfort.

The implication of these defects in security include that the airports are exposed to not just stowaways, but terror attacks, and because an authorised person can easily gain access to the airport, it would be easier for insider threat.

An aviation security consultant, Group Capt John Ojikutu (rtd), told Woleshadare.net that what makes stowaways possible is the airport where access control to the security controlled area is defective and or there is no security fence or the perimeter fence is porous and not security enhanced.

It also means, according to Ojikutu, that security operatives are not alert to their duties.

Wole Shadare