Cockpit Chaos: When a captain chooses to be sky-high

Chaos in the cockpit, danger in the skies

Both pilots and cabin crew have a wide range of skills and knowledge to successfully fly an aircraft from point A to point B. While most think that those competencies only revolve around the technical knowledge, soft skills sometimes get overlooked, writes WOLE SHADARE

On July 13, 2025, a B737-500 aircraft belonging to Air Peace caused a stir among stakeholders in the aviation industry with the manner in which the aircraft veered off the runway completely after landing at the Obafemi Jeremiah Awolowo Airport, Port-Harcourt.

Thankfully, no one out of the 103 passengers suffered any harm, but it became a mystery what could have happened to the aircraft, as no weather condition could have made people point to a wet runway surface.

Damning report

Every possibility of what happened only remained a conjecture as the body, the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) empowered by law to probe causes of accidents and serious incidents in the aviation industry came out with a damning report of what ‘truly’ happened in its preliminary report made available to the media last week Friday which the carrier faulted, denying that its crew took alcohol and cannabis before the flight.

Investigators explained that the aircraft was stable on approach until it got close to landing, adding that at 1,000 feet above the ground, the situation appeared normal, and the captain disconnected the autopilot at 500 feet to complete the landing manually. Shortly after, the aircraft drifted above the normal landing path.

“The captain later admitted that by the time he realised, the aircraft was already too high. It crossed the runway threshold at about 2000 feet, which is much higher than the recommended landing height.’

“The first officer, who was younger and had less than 900 hours of flying experience, told the captain to go around and attempt another landing. This is a standard safety procedure, but the captain, an older and highly experienced pilot with over 10,000 hours on the Boeing 737, decided to continue”.

It noted that the decision proved costly, stressing that the aircraft touched down almost three-quarters of the way down the 3,000 metre runway, leaving very little space to slow down.

“It rolled for almost another kilometre before overshooting the runway and stopping on the grass. Thankfully, there were no injuries, and passengers disembarked safely.”

Chaos in the cockpit

The central theme in the report centred on the consumption of alcohol by the captain of the flight (Name withheld), the co-pilot, indictment of a cabin crew of the airline on cannabis consumption and more tellingly, the glaring absence of coordination between the pilot and his co-pilot. There seemed to be chaos in the cockpit. They did not work as a team, a situation that put the lives of 103 passengers and crew in jeopardy.

The airline did not waste time in suspending the 64-year-old pilot whose retirement is due next year for disregarding standard go-around procedures as advised by his co-pilot, saying, “However, if the relieved captain tests positive on the breathalyser test, then we must increase the frequency of our alcohol and drug tests on our crew. Again, the importance of Enhanced Crew Resource Management Training cannot be over-emphasised”.

“We will intensify strict fitness-for-Duty checks and stronger internal monitoring to prevent any breach of our zero-tolerance safety policy. Air Peace has consistently maintained a strong safety record and strictly implements global best practices in all aspects of its operations. We reassure our esteemed passengers and the Nigerian public that safety will never be compromised in Air Peace”.

Poor communication affected their decision-making. The combination of incorrect information, assumptions, and time pressure mixes into a truly blood-chilling concoction.

The NSIB report and the admission of Air Peace to put its house in order in the area of Crew Resource Management (CRM) or Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) are critical components of safety in the operation of aircraft.

The NSIB report, aside from indicting the crew of alcohol, highlighted the authority gap in the cockpit, with a 64-year-old captain commanding a young first officer; the balance of power was steep.

“This made it difficult for the younger pilot’s warning to influence the final decision. In aviation, such imbalances are dangerous because they can prevent the right call from being made when safety is at stake.”

The Safety Bureau advised Air Peace to strengthen its internal checks to ensure all crew members are fit for duty before flights. It also urged the airline to reinforce training on go-around procedures, stressing that no pilot should hesitate to abandon a poor approach and try again.

The NSIB noted that the incident has become a wake-up call, adding that while no lives were lost, it could have ended differently.

Runway overruns, it said, are one of the most serious risks in aviation, and when alcohol or drugs are involved, the danger multiplies.

Case for CRM

Looking back, CRM has been a relatively fresh addition to the overall aviation education. It wasn’t completely non-existent, but the focus lay in mastering the technical skills. Aviation is said to be the first industry overall to adopt the CRM principles, and United Airlines holds the status of having been the first to incorporate it into its curriculum in 1981. Regrettably, as with many aspects of aviation, a critical need for improvement in interpersonal and decision-making skills emerged in the wake of tragic aviation accidents.

Flight safety no longer seems to be primarily a matter of a pilot’s skills in handling their planes or even of technical reliability; pilots’ skills relating to interaction with other people were found to be at least as important.

 While no one can assess how many lives have been saved or crashes averted as a result of CRM training, the impact has been significant.

Although policies put in place to reduce pilot errors are not universal across the world, there are varying guidelines about how long a pilot can captain a flight, how many co-pilots should be present and how many hours a pilot can fly before taking mandatory breaks. There are also varying guidelines about how many hours of training pilots must complete, below what altitude they should not hand over control of a plane and when they should abort landings.

Mitigating errors

The vast majority of aircraft accidents result from pilot error. This has become obvious through a series of investigations. However, maybe aviation professionals haven’t done a good job of educating aircraft owners of that fact. Many companies spare no expense maintaining their aircraft to a top mechanical standard, and then continually gripe about the cost and inconvenience of initial and recurrent training for their pilots.

Expert’s view

A former Director-General of NSIB, Akin Olateru, an aircraft engineer, once said there is no perfect system anywhere, but all we can do as a nation, responsible people and a responsible agency is to ensure we step up the game in human factor.

“Human factor has been identified as the cause of accidents all over the world. We held a seminar to ensure that the operators and service providers invest in the training called the human factor. On our own as a government agency, we brought in the US NTSB to give a lecture on how we could deal with this human factor. They looked at all our past accidents.”

Conclusion

Situational awareness is the ability of the flight crew to see what is going on around them, understand what it means, and make predictions about what might happen next – tuning in their cognitive skills. It is essential for overall safety and successful decision-making. Flight crew is trained to maintain constant vigilance, keeping a watchful eye on their surroundings, monitoring crucial instrument readings, and staying alert to any changes in weather conditions or external factors that could influence flight operations.

Wole Shadare